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Deception-As-Defense Framework for
Cyber-Physical Systems
Muhammed O. Sayin and Tamer Başar
Abstract We introduce deceptive signaling framework as a new defense measure
against advanced adversaries in cyber-physical systems. In general, adversaries look
for system-related information, e.g., the underlying state of the system, in order
to learn the system dynamics and to receive useful feedback regarding the suc-
cess/failure of their actions so as to carry out their malicious task. To this end,
we craft the information that is accessible to adversaries strategically in order to
control their actions in a way that will benefit the system, indirectly and without
any explicit enforcement. Under the solution concept of game-theoretic hierarchi-
cal equilibrium, we arrive at a semi-definite programming problem equivalent to
the infinite-dimensional optimization problem faced by the defender while selecting
the best strategy when the information of interest is Gaussian and both sides have
quadratic cost functions. The equivalence result holds also for the scenarios where
the defender can have partial or noisy measurements or the objective of the adversary
is not known.We show the optimality of linear signaling rule within the general class
of measurable policies in communication scenarios and also compute the optimal
linear signaling rule in control scenarios.
1 Introduction
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy
believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War [27]
As quoted above, even the earliest known work on military strategy and war,
The Art of War, emphasizes the importance of deception in security. Deception
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can be used as a defense strategy by making the opponent/adversary to perceive
certain information of interest in an engineered way. Indeed, deception is also not
limited to hostile environments. In all non-cooperative multi-agent environments,
as long as there is asymmetry of information and one agent is informed about the
information of interest while the other is not, then the informed agent has power on
the uninformed one to manipulate his/her decisions or perceptions by sharing that
information strategically.
Especially with the introduction of cyber connectedness in physical systems, cer-
tain communication and control systems can be viewed as multi-agent environments,
where each agent makes rational decisions to fulfill certain objectives. As an exam-
ple, we can view transmitters (or sensors) and receivers (or controllers) as individual
agents in communication (or control) systems. However, classical communication
and control theory is based on the cooperation between these agents to meet certain
challenges together, such as in mitigating the impact of a noisy channel in com-
munication or in stabilizing the underlying state of a system around an equilibrium
through feedback in control. However, cyber connectedness makes these multi-agent
environments vulnerable against adversarial interventions and there is an inherent
asymmetry of information as the information flows from transmitters (or sensors) to
receivers (or controllers)1. Therefore, if these agents are not cooperating, e.g., due to
adversarial intervention, then the informed agents, i.e., transmitters or sensors, could
seek to deceive the uninformed ones, i.e., receivers or controllers, so that they would
perceive the underlying information of interest in a way the deceiver has desired,
and correspondingly would take the manipulated actions.
Our goal, here, is to craft the information that could be available to an adversary
in order to control his/her perception about the underlying state of the system as a
defensive measure. The malicious objective and the normal operation of the system
may not be completely opposite of each other as in the framework of a zero-sum
game, which implies that there is a part of malicious objective that is benign and
the adversary would be acting in line with the system’s interest with respect to that
aligned part of the objectives. If we can somehow restrain the adversarial actions
to fulfill only the aligned part, then the adversarial actions, i.e., the attack, could
inadvertently end up helping the system toward its goal. Since a rational adversary
wouldmake decisions based on the information available to him, the strategic crafting
of the signal that is shared with the adversary, or the adversary can have access to, can
be effective in that respect. Therefore, our goal is to design the information flowing
from the informed agents, e.g., sensors, to the uninformed ones, e.g., controllers, in
view of the possibility of adversarial intervention, so as to control the perception of
the adversaries about the underlying system, and correspondingly to persuade them
(without any explicit enforcement) to fulfill the aligned parts of the objectives as
much as possible without fulfilling the misaligned parts.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the recent results [25, 21, 24] ad-
dressing certain aspects of this challenge in non-cooperative communication and
1 In control systems, we can also view the control input as information that flows implicitly from
the controllers to the sensors since it impacts the underlying state and correspondingly the sensors’
measurements.
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control settings. For a discrete-time Gauss Markov process, and when the sender and
the receiver in a non-cooperative communication setting have misaligned quadratic
objectives, in [25], we have shown the optimality of linear signaling rules2 within
the general class of measurable policies and provided an algorithm to compute the
optimal policies numerically. Also in [25], we have formulated the optimal linear
signaling rule in a non-cooperative linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control setting
when the sensor and the controller have knownmisaligned control objectives. In [21],
we have introduced a secure sensor design framework, where we have addressed the
optimal linear signaling rule again in a non-cooperative LQG setting when the sensor
and private-type controller have misaligned control objectives in a Bayesian setting,
i.e., the distribution over the private type of the controller is known. In [24], we
have addressed the optimal linear robust signaling in a non-Bayesian setting, where
the distribution over the private type of the controller is not known, and provided
a comprehensive formulation by considering also the cases where the sensor could
have partial or noisy information on the signal of interest and relevance.We elaborate
further on these results in some detail throughout the chapter.
In Section 2, we review the related literature in economics and engineering. In
Sections 3 and 4,we introduce the framework and formulate the deception-as-defense
game, respectively. In Section 5, we elaborate on Gaussian information of interest in
detail. In Sections 6 and 7, we address the optimal signaling rules in non-cooperative
communication and control systems. In Section 8, we provide the optimal signaling
rule against the worst possible distribution over the private types of the uninformed
agent. In Section 9, we extend the results to partial or noisy measurements of the
underlying information of interest. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 10
with several remarks and possible research directions.
Notation: Random variables are denoted by bold lower case letters, e.g., x . For
a random vector x , cov{x} denotes the corresponding covariance matrix. For an
ordered set of parameters, e.g., x1, . . . , xκ , we use the notation xk:l = xl, . . . , xk ,
where 1 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ κ. N(0, ·) denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and designated covariance. For a vector x and a matrix A, x ′ and A′
denote their transposes, and ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean `2-norm of the vector x. For
a matrix A, Tr{A} denotes its trace. We denote the identity and zero matrices with
the associated dimensions by I and O, respectively. Sm denotes the set of m-by-m
symmetric matrices. For positive semi-definite matrices A and B, A  B means that
A − B is also positive semi-definite.
2 Deception Theory in Literature
There are various definitions of deception. Depending on the specific definition at
hand, the analysis or the related applications vary. Commonly in signaling-based
deception definitions, there is an information of interest private to an informed agent
2 We use the terms “strategy", “signaling/decision rule", and “policy" interchangeably.
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whereas an uninformed agent may benefit from that information to make a certain
decision. If the informed and uninformed agents are strategic while, respectively,
sharing information and making a decision, then the interaction can turn into a
game where the agents select their strategies according to their own objectives while
taking into account the fact that the other agent would also have selected his/her
strategy according to his/her different objective. Correspondingly, such an interaction
between the informed and uninformed agents can be analyzed under a game-theoretic
solution concept. Note that there is a main distinction between incentive compatible
deception model and deception model with policy commitment.
Definition 1 We say that a deception model is incentive compatible if neither the
informed nor the uninformed agent have an incentive to deviate from their strategies
unilaterally.
The associated solution concept here is Nash equilibrium [2]. Existence of a Nash
equilibrium is not guaranteed in general. Furthermore, even if it exists, there may
also be multiple Nash equilibria. Without certain commitments, any of the equilibria
may not be realized or if one has been realized, which of them would be realized is
not certain beforehand since different ones could be favorable for different players.
Definition 2 We say that in a deception model, there is policy commitment if either
the informed or the uninformed agent commits to play a certain strategy beforehand
and the other agent reacts being aware of the committed strategy.
The associated solution concept is Stackelberg equilibrium, where one of the
players leads the game by announcing his/her committed strategy [2]. Existence
of a Stackelberg equilibrium is not guaranteed in general over unbounded strategy
spaces. However, if it exists, all the equilibria would lead to the same game outcome
for the leader of the game since the leader could have always selected the favorable
one among them. We also note that if there is a favorable outcome for the leader in
the incentive compatible model, the leader has the freedom to commit to that policy
in the latter model. Correspondingly, the leader is advantageous by acting first to
commit to play according to a certain strategy even though the result may not be
incentive compatible.
Game theoretical analysis of deception has attracted substantial interest in various
disciplines, including economics and engineering fields. In the following subsections,
we review the literature in these disciplineswith respect tomodels involving incentive
compatibility and policy commitment.
2.1 Economics Literature
The scheme of the type introduced above, called strategic information transmission,
was introduced in a seminal paper by V. Crawford and J. Sobel in [9]. This has
attracted significant attention in the economics literature due to the wide range
of relevant applications, from advertising to expert advise sharing. In the model
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adopted in [9], the informed agent’s objective function includes a commonly known
bias term different from the uninformed agent’s objective. That bias term can be
viewed as the misalignment factor in-between the two objectives. For the incentive
compatible model, the authors have shown that all equilibria are partition equilibria,
where the informed agent controls the resolution of the information shared via certain
quantization schemes, under certain assumptions on the objective functions (satisfied
by quadratic objectives), and the assumption that the information of interest is drawn
from a bounded support.
Following this inaugural introduction of the strategic information transmission
framework, also called cheap talk due to the costless communication over an ideal
channel, different settings, such as
• Single sender and multiple receivers [11, 12],
• Multiple senders and single receiver [13, 17],
• Repeated games [18],
have been studied extensively; however, all have considered the scenarios where
the underlying information is one-dimensional, e.g., a real number. However, multi-
dimensional information can lead to interesting results like full revelation of the
information even when the misalignment between the objectives is arbitrarily large
if there are multiple senders with different bias terms, i.e., misalignment factors [3].
Furthermore, if there is only one sender yet multidimensional information, there can
be full revelation of information at certain dimensions while at the other dimensions,
the sender signals partially in a partition equilibrium depending on the misalignment
between the objectives [3].
The ensuing studies [11, 13, 12, 17, 18, 3] on cheap talk [9] have analyzed the in-
centive compatibility of the players.More recently, in [16], the authors have proposed
to use a deception model with policy commitment. They call it “sender-preferred
sub-game perfect equilibrium" since the sender cannot distort or conceal information
once the signal realization is known, which can be viewed as the sender revealing and
committing to the signaling rule in addition to the corresponding signal realization.
For information of interest drawn from a compact metric space, the authors have
provided necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a strategic signal
that can benefit the informed agent, and characterized the corresponding optimal
signaling rule. Furthermore, in [28], the author has shown the optimality of linear
signaling rules for multivariate Gaussian information of interest and with quadratic
objective functions.
2.2 Engineering Literature
There exist various engineering applications depending on the definition of decep-
tion. Reference [19] provides a taxonomy of these studies with a specific focus on
security. Obfuscation techniques to hide valuable information, e.g., via externally
introduced noise [15, 8, 30] can also be viewed as deception based defense. As an
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example, in [15], the authors have provided a browser extension that can obfuscate
user’s real queries by including automatically-fabricated queries to preserve privacy.
Here, however, we specifically focus on signaling-based deception applications, in
which we craft the information available to adversaries to control their perception
rather than corrupting it. In line with the browser extension example, our goal is to
persuade the query trackers to perceive the user behavior in a certain fabricated way
rather than limiting their ability to learn the actual user behavior.
In computer security, various (heuristic) deception techniques, e.g., honeypots
and honey nets, are prevalent to make the adversary perceive a honey-system as
the real one or a real system as a honey-one [26]. Several studies, e.g., [7], have
analyzed honeypots within the framework of binary signaling games by abstracting
the complexity of crafting a real system to be perceived as a honeypot (or crafting a
honeypot to be perceived as a real system) to binary signals. However, here, our goal
is to address the optimal way to craft the underlying information of interest with a
continuum support, e.g., a Gaussian state.
The recent study [20] addresses strategic information transmission of multivari-
ate Gaussian information over an additive Gaussian noise channel for quadratic
misaligned cost functions and identifies the conditions where the signaling rule at-
taining a Nash equilibrium can be a linear function. Recall that for scalar case, when
there is no noisy channel in-between, all the equilibria are partition equilibria, imply-
ing all the signaling rules attaining a Nash equilibrium are nonlinear except babbling
equilibrium, where the informed agent discloses no information [9]. Two other re-
cent studies [1] and [10] address strategic information transmission for the scenarios
where the bias term is not common knowledge of the players and the solution concept
is Stackelberg equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. They have shown that the
Stackelberg equilibrium could be attained by linear signaling rules under certain con-
ditions, different from the partition equilibria in the incentive compatible cheap talk
model [9]. In [10], the authors have studied strategic sensor networks for multivariate
Gaussian information of interest and with myopic quadratic objective functions in
dynamic environments and by restricting the receiver’s strategies to affine functions.
In [1], for jointly Gaussian scalar private information and bias variable, the authors
have shown that optimal sender strategies are linear functions within the general
class of measurable policies for misaligned quadratic cost functions when there is an
additive Gaussian noise channel and hard power constraint on the signal, i.e., when
it is no longer cheap talk.
3 Deception-As-Defense Framework
Consider a multi-agent environment with asymmetry of information, where each
agent is a selfish decision maker taking action or actions to fulfill his/her own
objective only while actions of any agent could impact the objectives of the others.
As an example, Fig. 1 illustrates a scenario with two agents: Sender (S) and Receiver
(R), where S has access to (possibly partial or noisy version of) certain information
Deception-As-Defense Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems 7
Decision
(Valuable	to all)
Information
(Valuable	to all) Signal(s)
Sender Receiver
Fig. 1 Strategic information disclosure.
valuable to R, and S sends a signal or signals related to the information of interest to
R.
Definition 3 We say that an informed agent (or the signal the agent crafts) is decep-
tive if he/she shapes the information of interest private to him/her strategically in
order to control the perception of the uninformed agent by removing, changing, or
adding contents.
Deceptive signaling can play a key role in multi-agent non-cooperative environ-
ments as well as in cooperative ones, where certain (uninformed) agents could have
been compromised by certain adversaries. In such scenarios, informed agents can
signal strategically to the uninformed ones in case they could have been compro-
mised. Furthermore, deceiving an adversary to act, or attack the system in a way
aligned with the system’s goals can be viewed as being too optimistic due to the
very definition of adversary. However, an adversary can also be viewed as a selfish
decision maker seeking to satisfy a certain malicious objective, which may not nec-
essarily be completely conflicting with the system’s objective. This now leads to the
following notion of “deception-as-defense".
Definition 4 We say that an informed agent engages in a deception-as-defensemode
of operation if he/she crafts the information of interest strategically to persuade the
uninformed malicious agent (without any explicit enforcement) to act in line with
the aligned part of the objective as much as possible without taking into account the
misaligned part.
We re-emphasize that this approach differs from the approaches that seek to
raise suspicion on the information of interest to sabotage the adversaries’ malicious
objectives. Sabotaging the adversaries’ malicious objectives may not necessarily be
the best option for the informed agent unless the objectives are completely opposite
of each other. In this latter case, the deception-as-defense framework actually ends
up seeking to sabotage the adversaries’ malicious objectives.
We also note that this approach differs from lying, i.e., the scenario where the
informed agent provides a totally different information (correlated or not) as if it
is the information of interest. Lying could be effective, as expected, as long as the
uninformed agent trusts the legitimacy of the provided information. However, in non-
cooperative environments, this could turn into a game where the uninformed agent
becomes aware of the possibility of lying. This correspondingly raises suspicion on
the legitimacy of the shared information and could end up sabotaging the adversaries’
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malicious objectives rather than controlling their perception of the information of
interest.
Once a defense mechanism has been widely deployed, this can cause the advanced
adversaries learn the defense policy in the course of time. Correspondingly, the
solution concept of policy commitment model can address this possibility in the
deception-as-defense framework in a robust way if the defender commits to a certain
policy that takes into account the best reaction of the adversaries that are aware
of the policy. Furthermore, the transparency of the signal sent via the committed
policy generates a trust-based relationship in-between S and R, which is powerful to
persuade R to make certain decisions inadvertently without any explicit enforcement
by S.
4 Game Formulation
The information of interest is considered to be a realization of a known, continuous,
random variable in static settings or a known (discrete-time) random process in
dynamic settings. Since the static setting is a special case of the dynamic setting,
we formulate the game in a dynamic, i.e., multi-stage, environment. We denote the
information of interest by {xk ∈ X}, where X ⊂ Rm denotes its support. Let {xk}
have zero mean and (finite) second-order moment Σk := cov{xk} ∈ Sm. We consider
the scenarios where each agent has perfect recall and constructs his/her strategy
accordingly. S has access to a possibly partial or noisy version of the information of
interest, xk . We denote the noisy measurement of xk by yk ∈ Y, where Y ⊂ Rm
denotes its support. For each instance of the information of interest, S selects his/her
signal as a second-order random variable
sk = ηk(y1:k), (1)
correlated with y1:k , but not necessarily determined through a deterministic transfor-
mation on y1:k (i.e., ηk(·) is in general a random mapping). Let us denote the set of
all signaling rules by Υk . As we will show later, when we allow for such randomness
in the signaling rule, under certain conditions the solution turns out to be a linear
function of the underlying information y1:k and an additive independent noise term.
Due to the policy commitment by S, at each instant, with perfect recall, R selects a
Borel measurable decision rule γk : Sk →U, whereU ⊂ Rr , from a certain policy
space Γk in order to make a decision
uk = γk(s1:k), (2)
knowing the signaling rules {ηk} and observing the signals sent s1:k .
Let κ denote the length of the horizon. We consider that the agents have cost func-
tions to minimize, instead of utility functions to maximize. Clearly, the framework
could also be formulated accordingly for utility maximization rather straightfor-
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wardly. Furthermore, we specifically consider that the agents have quadratic cost
functions, denoted by US(η1:κ, γ1:κ) and UR(η1:κ, γ1:κ).
An Example in Non-cooperative Communication Systems
Over a finite horizon with length κ, S seeks to minimize over η1:κ ∈ Υ :=producttext1κk=1 Υk
US(η1:κ, γ1:κ) = E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖QSxk − RSγk(η1(y1), . . . , ηk(y1:k))‖2
}
= E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖QSxk − RSuk ‖2
}
, (3)
by taking into account that R seeks to minimize over γ1:κ ∈ Γ :=producttext1κk=1 Γk
UR(η1:κ, γ1:κ) = E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖QRxk − RRγk(η1(y1), . . . , ηk(y1:k))‖2
}
= E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖QRxk − RRuk ‖2
}
, (4)
where the weight matrices are arbitrary (but fixed). The following special case
illustrates the applicability of this general structure of misaligned objectives (3) and
(4). Suppose that the information of interest consists of two separate processes {zk}
and {t k}, e.g., xk :=
[
z ′
k
t ′
k
] ′. Then (3) and (4) cover the scenarios where R seeks to
estimate zk by minimizing
E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖zk − uk ‖2
}
, (5)
whereas S wants R to perceive zk as t k , and end up minimizing
E
{
κ∑
k=1
‖t k − uk ‖2
}
. (6)
An Example in Non-cooperative Control Systems
Consider a controlled Markov process, e.g.,
xk+1 = Axk + Buk +wk, (7)
where wk ∼ N(0, Σw) is a white Gaussian noise process. S seeks to minimize over
η1:κ ∈ Υ
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US(η1:κ, γ1:κ) = E
{
κ∑
k=1
x ′k+1QSxk+1 + u
′
kRSuk
}
, (8)
by taking into account that R seeks to minimize over γ1:κ ∈ Γ
UR(η1:κ, γ1:κ) = E
{
κ∑
k=1
x ′k+1QRxk+1 + u
′
kRRuk
}
, (9)
with arbitrary (but fixed) positive semi-definite matrices QS and QR, and positive-
definite matrices RS and RR. Similar to the example in communication systems,
this general structure of misaligned objectives (8) and (9) can bring in interesting
applications. Suppose the information of interest consists of two separate processes
{zk} and {t k}, e.g., xk :=
[
z ′
k
t ′
k
] ′, where {t k} is an exogenous process, which does
not depend on R’s decision uk . For certain weight matrices, (8) and (9) cover the
scenarios where R seeks to regularize {zk} around zero vector by minimizing
E
{
κ∑
k=1
z ′k+1zk+1 + u
′
kuk
}
, (10)
whereas S seeks R to regularize {zk} around the exogenous process {t k} by mini-
mizing
E
{
κ∑
k=1
(zk+1 − t k+1)′(zk+1 − t k+1) + u ′kuk
}
. (11)
We define the deception-as-defense game as follows:
Definition 5 The deception-as-defense game G := (Υ, Γ, {xk}, {yk},US,UR) is a
Stackelberg game between S and R, where
• {xk} denotes the information of interest,
• {yk} denotes S’s (possibly noisy) measurements of the information of interest,
• US and UR are the objective functions of S and R, defined respectively by (3) and
(4), or (8) and (9).
Under the deception model with policy commitment, S is the leader, who announces
(and commits to) his strategies beforehand, while R is the follower, reacting to the
leader’s announced strategies. Since R is the follower and takes actions knowing S’s
strategy η1:κ ∈ Υ, we let B(η1:κ) ⊂ Γ be R’s best reaction set to S’s strategy η1:κ ∈
Υ. Then, the strategy and best reaction pair (η∗1:κ, B(η∗1:κ)) attains the Stackelberg
equilibrium provided that
η∗1:κ ∈ argmin
η1:κ ∈Υ
max
γ1:κ ∈B(η1:κ )
US(η1:κ, γ1:κ), (12)
B(η1:κ) = argmin
γ1:κ ∈Γ
UR(η1:κ, γ1:κ). (13)
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5 Quadratic Costs and Information of Interest
Misaligned quadratic cost functions, in addition to their various applications, play
an essential role in the analysis of the game G. One advantage is that a quadratic
cost function can be written as a linear function of the covariance of the posterior
estimate of the underlying information of interest. Furthermore,when the information
of interest is Gaussian, we can formulate a necessary and sufficient condition on
the covariance of the posterior estimate, which turns out to be just semi-definite
matrix inequalities. This leads to an equivalent semi-definite programming (SDP)
problem over a finite dimensional space instead of finding the best signaling rule
over an infinite-dimensional policy space. In the following, we elaborate on these
observations in further detail.
Due to the policy commitment, S needs to anticipate R’s reaction to the selected
signaling rule η1:κ ∈ Υ. Here, we will focus on the non-cooperative communication
system, and later in Section 7, we will show howwe can transform a non-cooperative
control setting into a non-cooperative communication setting under certain condi-
tions. Since the information flow is in only one direction, R faces the least mean
square error problem for given η1:κ ∈ Υ. Suppose that R′RRR is invertible. Then, the
best reaction by R is given by
γ∗k(s1:k) = (R′RRR)−1R′RQRE{xk |s1:k}, (14)
almost everywhere over Rr . Note that the best reaction set B(η1:κ) is a singleton and
the best reaction is linear in the posterior estimate E{xk |s1:k}, i.e., the conditional
expectation of xk with respect to the random variables s1:k . When we substitute the
best reaction by R into S’s cost function, we obtain
κ∑
k=1
E‖QSxk − MSE{xk |s1:κ}‖2, (15)
where MS := RS(R′RRR)−1R′RQR. Since for arbitrary random variables a and b,
E{aE{a |b}} = E{E{a |b}E{a |b}}, (16)
the objective function to be minimized by S, (15), can be written as
κ∑
k=1
E‖QSxk − MSE{xk |s1:κ}‖2 =
κ∑
k=1
Tr{HkV} + c, (17)
where Hk := cov{E{xk |s1:k}} denotes the covariance of the posterior estimate,
V := M ′SMS − M ′SQS −Q′SMS (18)
and the constant c is given by
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c :=
κ∑
k=1
Tr{Q′SQSΣk}. (19)
We emphasize that Hk ∈ Sm is not the posterior covariance, i.e., cov{E{xk |s1:k}} ,
cov{xk |s1:k} in general.
The cost function depends on the signaling rule η1:κ ∈ Υ only through the
covariance matrices H1:κ and the cost is an affine function of H1:κ . By formulating
the relation, we can obtain an equivalent finite-dimensional optimization problem
over the space of symmetric matrices as an alternative to the infinite-dimensional
problem over the policy space Υ. Next, we seek to address the following question.
•? Relation between η1:κ and H1:κ
What is the relation between the signaling rule η1:κ ∈ Υ and the covariance of the
posterior estimate H1:κ?
Here, we only consider the scenario where S has access to the underlying in-
formation of interest perfectly. We will address the scenarios with partial or noisy
measurements in Section 9 by transforming that setting to the setting of perfect
measurements.
There are two extreme cases for the shared information: either sharing the infor-
mation fully without any crafting or sharing no information. The former one implies
that the covariance of the posterior estimate would be Σk whereas the latter one
implies that it would be cov{E{xk |s1:k−1}} since R has perfect memory.
•? In-between the extremes of sharing everything and sharing nothing
What would Hk ∈ Sm be if S has shared the information only partially?
To address this, if we consider the positive semi-definite matrix cov{xk −
E{xk |s1:k}}, by (16) we obtain
cov{xk − E{xk |s1:k}} = Σk − Hk . (20)
Furthermore, if we consider the positive semi-definite matrix cov{E{xk |s1:k} −
E{xk |s1:k−1}}, by (16) we obtain
cov{E{xk |s1:k} − E{xk |s1:k−1}} = Hk − cov{E{xk |s1:k−1}}. (21)
Therefore, based on (20) and (21), we obtain the necessary condition:
Σk  Hk  cov{E{xk |s1:k−1}}, (22)
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Fig. 2 Afigurative illustration
that the covariance of the
posterior estimate H1 is
bounded from above and
below by the semi-cones
in the space of symmetric
matrices, i.e., Σ1  H1 
Om . Furthermore, we can
transform the space to the
form at the right figure through
certain linear mapping L1 :
Sm → Sn , where n ∈ Z may
be different from m ∈ Z.
Om
Σ1
On
In
H1 L1(H1)
Linear
Transformation
L1 : Sm → Sn
which is independent of the distribution of the underlying information and the policy
space of S.
•? Sufficient Condition
What would be the sufficient condition? Is the necessary condition on Hk ∈ Sm (22)
sufficient?
The sufficient condition for arbitrary distributions is an open problem. However,
in the following subsection, we show that when information of interest is Gaussian,
we can address the challenge and the necessary condition turns out to be sufficient.
5.1 Gaussian Information of Interest
In addition to its use in modeling various uncertain phenomena based on the cen-
tral limit theorem, Gaussian distribution has special characteristics which make it
versatile in various engineering applications, e.g., in communication and control.
The deception-as-defense framework is not an exception for the versatility of the
Gaussian distribution. As an example, if the information of interest is Gaussian, the
optimal signaling rule turns out to be a linear function within the general class of
measurable policies, as to be shown in different settings throughout this chapter.
Let us first focus on the single-stage setting, where the necessary condition (22)
is given as
Σ1  H1  Om. (23)
The convention here is that for arbitrary symmetric matrices A, B ∈ Sm, A  B
means that A − B  O, that is positive semi-definite. We further note that the
space of positive-semi-definite matrices is a semi-cone [29]. Correspondingly, Fig.
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2 provides a figurative illustration of (23), where H1 ∈ Sm is bounded from both
below and above by certain semi-cones in the space of symmetric matrices.
With a certain linear transformation bijective over (23), denoted byL1 : Sm → Sn,
where n ∈ Z is not necessarily the same with m ∈ Z, the necessary condition (23)
can be written as
In  L1(H1)  On. (24)
As an example of such a linear mapping when Σ1 ∈ Sm is invertible, we can consider
L1(H1) = Σ−1/21 H1Σ−1/21 and n = m. If Σ1 is singular, then the following lemma from
[23] plays an important role to compute such a linear mapping.
Lemma 1 Provided that a given positive semi-definite matrix can be partitioned into
blocks such that a block at the diagonal is a zero matrix, then certain off-diagonal
blocks must also be zero matrices, i.e.,[
A B
B′ O
]
 O ⇔ A  O and B = O. (25)
Let the singular Σ1 ∈ Sm with rank n < m have the eigen-decomposition
Σ1 = U1
[
Λ1 O
O O
]
U ′1, (26)
where Λ1  On. Then, (23) can be written as[
Λ1 O
O O
]
−
[
N1,1 N1,2
N ′1,2 N2,2
]
=
[
Λ1 − N1,1 −N1,2
−N ′1,2 −N2,2
]
 O, (27)
where we let
U ′1H1U1 =
[
N1,1 N1,2
N ′1,2 N2,2
]
(28)
be the corresponding partitioning, i.e., N1,1 ∈ Sn. SinceU ′1H1U1  Om, the diagonal
block N2,2 ∈ Sm−n must be positive semi-definite [14]. Further, (27) yields that
−N2,2  Om−n, which implies that N2,2 = Om−n. Invoking Lemma 1, we obtain
N1,2 = On×(m−n). Therefore, a linear mapping bijective over (23) is given by
L1(H1) =
[
Λ
−1/2
1 On×(m−n)
]
U ′1H1U1
[
Λ
−1/2
1
O(m−n)×n
]
, (29)
where the unitary matrixU1 ∈ Rm×m and the diagonal matrixΛ1 ∈ Sn are as defined
in (26).
With the linear mapping (29) that is bijective over (23), the necessary condition
on H1 ∈ Sm can be written as
Σ1  H1  Om ⇔ In  L1(H1)  On
⇒ Eigenvalues of L1(H1) are in the closed interval [0, 1]
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since the eigenvalues of In weakly majorize the eigenvalues of the positive
semi-definite L1(H1) from below [14].
Up to this point, the specific distribution of the information of interest did not
play any role. However, for the sufficiency of the condition (23), Gaussianness of the
information of interest plays a crucial role as shown in the following theorem [24].
Theorem 1 Consider m-variate Gaussian information of interest x1 ∼ N(0, Σ1).
Given any stochastic kernel η1 ∈ Υ1, we have
Σ1  cov{E{x1 |η1(x1)}}  Om. (30)
Furthermore, given any covariance matrix H1 ∈ Sm satisfying
Σ1  H1  Om, (31)
we have that there exists a probabilistic linear-in-x1 signaling rule
η1(x1) = L ′1x1 + n1, (32)
where L1 ∈ Rm×m and n1 ∼ N(0, Σo1 ) is an independent m-variate Gaussian random
variable, such that cov{E{x1 |η1(x1)}} = H1. Let L1(H1) ∈ Sn have the eigen-
decomposition L1(H1) = U¯1Λ¯1U¯ ′1 and Λ¯1 = diag{λ¯1,1, . . . , λ¯1,n}. Then, the corre-
sponding matrix L1 ∈ Rm×m and the covariance Σo1  Om are given by
L1 := U1
[
In
O
]
Λ
−1/2
1 U¯1Λ
o
1
[
In O
]
, (33)
where the unitary matrixU1 ∈ Rm×m and the diagonal matrixΛ1 ∈ Sn are as defined
in (26), Λo1 := diag{λo1,1, . . . , λo1,n}, Σo1 = diag{(σo1,1)2, . . . , (σo1,n)2, 0, . . . , 0}, and
(λo1,i)2
(λo1,i)2 + (σo1,i)2
= λ¯1,i ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (34)
Proof Note that for Gaussian information and the signaling rule (32), the covariance
of the posterior estimate is given by
cov{E{x1 |L ′1x1 + n1}} = Σ1L1(L ′1Σ1L1 + Σo1 )†L ′1Σ1 (35)
Given H1 ∈ Sm satisfying (47), for (33) and (34), the linear-in-x1 signaling rule (32)
yields that cov{E{x1 |L ′1x1 + n1}} = H1. 
•> Implication of Theorem 1
If the underlying information of interest is Gaussian, instead of the functional
optimization problem
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min
η1∈Υ
E‖QSx1 − KSE{x1 |η1(x1)}‖2, (36)
we can consider the equivalent finite-dimensional problem
min
S∈S
Tr{SV}, subject to Σ1  S  O. (37)
Then, we can compute the optimal signaling rule η∗1 corresponding to the solution
of (37) via (32)-(34).
Without any need to solve the functional optimization problem (36), Theorem
1 shows the optimality of the “linear plus a random variable" signaling rule
within the general class of stochastic kernels when the information of interest
is Gaussian.
•! Versatility of the Equivalence
Furthermore, a linear signaling rule would still be optimal even when we intro-
duce additional constraints on the covariance of the posterior since the equivalence
between (36) and (37) is not limited with the equivalence in optimality.
Recall that the distribution of the underlying information plays a role only in
proving the sufficiency of the necessary condition. Therefore, in general, based on
only the necessary condition, we have
min
η1∈Υ
E‖QSx1 − KSE{x1 |η1(x1)}‖2 ≥ min
S∈S
Tr{SV}, subject to Σ1  S  O. (38)
The equality holds when the information of interest is Gaussian.
Therefore, for fixed covariance Σ1 ∈ Sm, Gaussian distribution is the best
one for S to persuade R in accordance with his/her deceptive objective, since
it yields total freedom to attain any covariance of the posterior estimate in-
between the two extremes Σ1  H1  O.
The following counter example shows that the sufficiency of the necessary con-
dition (47) holds only in the case of the Gaussian distribution.
A Counter Example for Arbitrary Distributions
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For a clear demonstration, suppose that m = 2 and Σ1 = I2, and correspondingly
x1 =
[
x1,1 x1,2
] ′. The covariancematrixH := [1 00 0] satisfies the necessary condition
(47) since
I2  H  O2, (39)
which implies that the signal s1 must be fully informative about x1,1 without giving
any information about x1,2. Note that Σ1 = I2 only implies that x1,1 and x1,2 are
uncorrelated, yet not necessarily independent for arbitrary distributions. Therefore,
if x1,1 and x1,2 are uncorrelated but dependent, then any signaling rule cannot
attain that covariance of the posterior estimate even though it satisfies the necessary
condition.
Let us now consider a Gauss-Markov process, which follows the following first-
order auto-regressive recursion
xk+1 = Axk +wk, (40)
where A ∈ Rm×m and wk ∼ N(0, Σw). For this model, the necessary condition (22)
is given by
Σk  Hk  AHk−1A′, (41)
for k = 2, . . . , κ. Given H1:k−1, let Σk − AHk−1A′ have the eigen-decomposition
Σk − AHk−1A′ = Uk
[
Λk O
O O
]
U ′k, (42)
where Λk  Onk , i.e., Σk − AHk−1A′ has rank nk . The linear transformation Lk :producttext1k
i=1 S
m → Sn given by
Lk(H1:k) =
[
Λ
1/2
k
Om−nk
]
U ′k(Hk − AHk−1A′)Uk
[
Λ
1/2
k
Om−nk
]
(43)
is bijective over (41). With the linear mapping (43), the necessary condition on
H1:κ ∈producttext1κi=1 Sm can be written as
Σk  Hk  AHk−1A′⇔ Ink  Lk(H1:k)  Onk , (44)
which correspondingly yields that Lk(H1:k) ∈ Snk has eigenvalues in the closed
interval [0, 1]. Then, the following theorem extends the equivalence result of the
single-stage to multi-stage ones [24].
Theorem 2 Consider the m-variate Gauss-Markov process {xk ∼ N(0, Σk)} follow-
ing the state recursion (40). Given any stochastic kernel ηk ∈ Υk for k = 1, . . . , κ,
we have
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Σ1  cov{E{x1 |s1}}  Om (45)
Σk  cov{E{xk |s1:k}}  Acov{E{xk−1 |s1:k−1}}A′, k = 2, . . . , κ. (46)
Furthermore, given any covariance matrices H1:κ ∈producttext1κi=1 Sm satisfying
Σk  Hk  AHk−1A′, (47)
where H0 = Om, then there exists a probabilistic linear-in-xk , i.e., memoryless,
signaling rule
ηk(x1:k) = L ′kxk + nk, (48)
where Lk ∈ Rm×m and {nk ∼ N(0, Σok )} is independently distributedm-variate Gaus-
sian process such that cov{E{xk |η1(x1), . . . , ηk(x1:k)}} = Hk for all k = 1, . . . , κ.
GivenH1:k−1, letLk(H1:k) ∈ Snk have the eigen-decompositionLk(H1:k) = U¯kΛ¯kU¯ ′k
and Λ¯k = diag{λ¯k,1, . . . , λ¯k,nk }. Then, the corresponding matrix Lk ∈ Rm×m and
the covariance Σo
k
 Om are given by
Lk := Uk
[
Ink
O
]
Λ
−1/2
k
U¯kΛ
o
k
[
Ink O
]
, (49)
where the unitary matrixUk ∈ Rm×m and the diagonal matrix Λk ∈ Snk are defined
in (42), Λo
k
:= diag{λo
k,1, . . . , λ
o
k,nk
}, Σo
k
= diag{(σo
k,1)2, . . . , (σok,nk )2, 0, . . . , 0}, and
(λo
k,i
)2
(λo
k,i
)2 + (σo
k,i
)2 = λ¯k,i ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i = 1, . . . , nk . (50)
Without any need to solve the functional optimization problem
min
η1:κ ∈Υ
κ∑
k=1
E‖QSxk − KSE{xk |η1(x1), . . . , ηk(x1:k)}‖2, (51)
Theorem 2 shows the optimality of the “linear plus a random variable" sig-
naling rule within the general class of stochastic kernels also in dynamic
environments, when the information of interest is Gaussian.
6 Communication Systems
In this section, we elaborate further on the deception-as-defense framework in non-
cooperative communication systems with a specific focus on Gaussian information
of interest. We first note that in this case the optimal signaling rule turns out to be
a linear deterministic signaling rule, where S does not need to introduce additional
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independent noise on the signal sent. Furthermore, the optimal signaling rule can be
computed analytically for the single-stage game [28]. We also extend the result on
the optimality of linear signaling rules to multi-stage ones [25].
In the single stage setting, by Theorem 1, the SDP problem equivalent to the
problem (15) faced by S is given by
min
S∈Sm
Tr{SV} subject to Σ1  S  Om. (52)
We can have a closed form solution for the equivalent SDP problem (15) [28]. If
Σ1 ∈ Sm has rank n, then a change of variable with the linear mappingL1 : Sm → Sn
(29), e.g., T := L1(S), yields that (52) can be written as
min
T ∈Sn
Tr{TW} subject to In  T  Om, (53)
where
W :=
[
Λ
1/2
1 On×(m−n)
]
U ′1VU1
[
Λ
1/2
1
O(m−n)×n
]
. (54)
If we multiply each side of the inequalities in the constraint set of (53) from left and
right with unitary matrices such that the resulting matrices are still symmetric, the
semi-definiteness inequality would still hold. Therefore, let the symmetric matrix
W ∈ Sn have the eigen-decomposition
W =
[
U+ U−
] [Λ+ O
O −Λ−
] [
U ′+
U ′−
]
, (55)
where Λ+ and Λ− are positive semi-definite matrices with dimensions n+ and n−.
Then (53) could be written as
min
T+∈Sn+,
T−∈Sn−
Tr{T+Λ+} − Tr{T−Λ−} subject to In+  T+  On+, In−  T−  On− (56)
and there exists a Tr ∈ Rn+×n− such that
T =
[
U+ U−
] [T+ Tr
T ′r T−
] [
U ′+
U ′−
]
(57)
satisfies the constraint in (53). Then, the following lemma shows that an optimal
solution for (56) is given by T∗+ = On+ , T
∗
r = On+×n− , and T
∗− = On− . Therefore,
in (56), the second (negative semi-definite) term −Tr{T−Λ−} can be viewed as the
aligned part of the objectives whereas the remaining first (positive semi-definite)
term Tr{T+Λ+} is the misaligned part.
Lemma 2 For arbitrary In  A = [ai, j]  On and diagonal positive semi-definite
B = diag{b1, . . . , bn}  On, we have
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0 ≤ Tr{AB} =
n∑
i=1
ai,ibi ≤ Tr{B} =
n∑
i=1
bi . (58)
Proof The left inequality follows since Tr{AB} = Tr{A1/2BA1/2} while A1/2BA1/2
is positive semi-definite. The right inequality follows since the diagonal entries of
A are majorized from below by its eigenvalues by Schur Theorem [14] while the
eigenvalues of A are weakly majorized from below by the eigenvalues of In since
In  A [14]. 
Based on (57), the solution for (56) implies that the optimal solution for (53) is
given by
T∗ =
[
U+ U−
] [ On+ On+×n−
On−×n+ In−
] [
U ′+
U ′−
]
. (59)
By invoking Theorem 1 and (33), we obtain the following theorem to compute the
optimal signaling rule analytically in single-stage G (a version of the theorem can
be found in [28]).
Theorem 3 Consider a single-stage deception-as-defense game G, where S and
R have the cost functions (3) and (4), respectively. Then, an optimal signaling rule
is given by
η∗1(x1) =
[
In
O(m−n)×n
] [
On+×n
U ′−
]
Λ
−1/2
1
[
In On×(m−n)
]
U ′1x1, (60)
almost everywhere over Rm. The matrices U1 ∈ Rm×m, Λ1 ∈ Sn are as defined in
(26), and U− ∈ Rn×n− is as defined in (55).
Note that the optimal signaling rule (60) does not include any additional noise
term. The following corollary shows that the optimal signaling rule does not include
additional noise when κ > 1 as well (versions of this theorem can be found in [25]
and [23]).
Corollary 1 Consider a deception-as-defense game G, where the exogenous Gaus-
sian information of interest follows the first-order autoregressive model (40), and the
players S and R have the cost functions (3) and (4), respectively. Then, for the optimal
solution S∗1:κ ∈
producttext1κ
k=1 S
m of the equivalent problem, Pk := Lk(S∗1:k) is a symmetric
idempotent matrix, which implies that the eigenvalues of Pk ∈ Snk are either 0 or 1.
Let nk,1 ∈ Z denote the rank of Pk , and Pk have the eigen-decomposition
Pk =
[
Uk,0 Uk,1
] [Onk−nk,1
Ink,1
] [
U ′
k,0
U ′
k,1
]
. (61)
Then, the optimal signaling rule is given by
η∗k(x1:k) =
[
Ink
O(m−nk )×nk
] [
O(nk−nk,1)×nk
U ′
k,1
]
Λ
−1/2
k
[
Ink Onk×(m−nk )
]
U ′kxk, (62)
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almost everywhere over Rm, for k = 1, . . . , κ. The unitary matrix Uk ∈ Rm×m and
the diagonal matrix Λk ∈ Snk are defined in (42).
7 Control Systems
The deception-as-defense framework also covers the non-cooperative control set-
tings including a sensor observing the state of the system and a controller driving the
system based on the sensor outputs according to certain quadratic control objectives,
e.g., (9). Under the general game setting where the players can select any measur-
able policy, the control setting cannot be transformed into a communication setting
straight-forwardly since the problem features non-classical information due to the
asymmetry of information between the players and the dynamic interaction through
closed-loop feedback signals, which leads to two-way information flow rather than
one-way flow as in the communication setting in Section 6. However, the control set-
ting can be transformed into a non-cooperative communication setting under certain
conditions, e.g., when signaling rules are restricted to be linear plus a random term.
Consider a controlled Gauss-Markov process following the recursion (7), and
with players S and R seeking to minimize the quadratic control objectives (8) and
(9), respectively. Then, by completing to squares, the cost functions (8) and (9) can
be written as
E
{
κ∑
k=1
x ′k+1Q jxk + u
′
kRjuk
}
=
κ∑
k=1
E‖Kj,kxk + uk ‖2∆ j,k + δj,0, (63)
where j = S, R, and
Kj,k = ∆−1j,kB
′Q˜ j,k+1A (64)
∆j,k = B′Q˜ j,k+1B + Rj (65)
δj,0 = Tr{Q jΣ1} +
κ∑
k=1
Tr{Q˜ j,k+1Σw} (66)
and {Q˜ j,k} follows the discrete-time dynamic Riccati equation:
Q˜ j,k = Q j + A′(Q˜ j,k+1 − Q˜ j,k+1B∆−1j,kB′Q˜ j,k+1)A, (67)
and Q˜ j,κ+1 = Q j .
On the right-hand side of (63), the state depends on the control input u j,k , for
j = S, R, however, a routine change of variables yields that
κ∑
k=1
E‖Kj,kxk + uk ‖2∆ j,k =
κ∑
k=1
E‖Kj,kxok + uok ‖2∆ j,k , (68)
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where we have introduced the control-free, i.e., exogenous, process {xo
k
} following
the first-order auto-regressive model
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +wk, k = 1, . . . , κ, and x
o
1 = x1, (69)
and a linearly transformed control input
uok = uk + Kj,kBuk−1 + . . . + Kj,kA
k−2Bu1. (70)
•> Non-classical Information Scheme under General Game Settings
The right-hand side of (68) resembles the cost functions in the communication
setting, which may imply separability over the horizon and for
E‖Kj,kxok + uok ‖2∆ j,k , (71)
the optimal transformed control input is given by uo
k
= −Kj,kE{xok |s1:k} and the cor-
responding optimal control input could be computed by reversing the transformation
(70). However, here, the control rule constructs the control input based on the sensor
outputs, which are chosen strategically by the non-cooperating S while S constructs
the sensor outputs based on the actual state, which is driven by the control input,
rather than the control-free state. Therefore, R can have impact on the sensor outputs
by having an impact on the actual state. Therefore, the game G under the general
setting features a non-classical information scheme. However, if S’s strategies are
restricted to linear policies η`
k
∈ Υ`
k
⊂ Υk , given by
η`k(x1:k) = L ′k,kxk + . . . + L ′k,1x1 + nk, (72)
then we have
E{xok |L ′k,kxk+ . . . +L ′k,1x1 + nk, . . . , L ′1,1x1 + n1} (73)
= E{xok |L ′k,kxok + . . . + L ′k,1xo1 + nk, . . . , L ′1,1xo1 + n1} (74)
since by (7) and (69), the signal s i for i = 1, . . . , k can be written as
s i = L ′i,ix
o
i + . . .+ L
′
1,1x
o
1 +ni + L
′
i,iBui−1 + . . . + (L ′i,iAi−2 + . . . + L ′i,2)Bu1︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸
σ-s1:i−1 measurable
. (75)
Therefore, for a given “linear plus noise" signaling rule, the optimal transformed
control input is given by uo
k
= −Kj,kE{xok |s1:k}.
In order to reverse the transformation on the control input and to provide a compact
representation, we introduce
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Φj :=

I Kj,κB Kj,κAB · · · Kj,κAκ−2B
I Kj,κ−1B · · · Kj,κ−1Aκ−3B
I · · · Kj,κ−2Aκ−4B
. . .
...
I

, (76)
and block diagonal matrices
Kj := diag{Kj,κ, . . . ,Kj,1} and ∆j := diag{∆j,κ, . . . ,∆j,1}. (77)
Then, (68) can be written as
κ∑
k=1
E‖Kj,kxok + uok ‖2∆ j,k = E‖Kjxo + Φju‖2∆ j (78)
where we have introduced the augmented vectors u =
[
u ′κ · · · u ′1
] ′ and xo =[(xoκ )′ · · · (xo1 )′] ′.
To recap, S and R seek to minimize, respectively, the following cost functions
US (η`1:κ, γ1:κ) = E‖KSxo + ΦSu‖2∆S + δS,0, (79)
UR (η`1:κ, γ1:κ) = E‖KRxo + ΦRu‖2∆R + δR,0. (80)
We note the resemblance to the communication setting. Therefore following the
same lines, S faces the following problem:
min
η`1:κ ∈Υ`
κ∑
k=1
Tr{cov{E{xok |s1:k}}Vk} + vo, (81)
where vo := Tr{cov{xo(xo)}K ′S∆SKS} + δS,0 and
Vk = Ξk,k +
κ∑
i=k+1
Ξk,iAi−k + (Ai−k)′Ξi,k, (82)
where Ξk,i ∈ Rm×m is an m × m block of Ξ ∈ Rmκ×mκ , with indexing starting from
the right-bottom to the left-top, and
Ξ := M ′S∆SMS − M ′S∆SKS − K ′S∆SMS, (83)
where MS := ΦSΦ−1R KR.
The optimal linear signaling rule in control systems can be computed according
to Corollary 1 based on (81).
24 Muhammed O. Sayin and Tamer Başar
8 Uncertainty in the Uninformed Agent’s Objective
In the deception-as-defense game G, the objectives of the players are common
knowledge. However, there might be scenarios where the objective of the uninformed
attacker may not be known precisely by the informed defender. In this section,
our goal is to extend the results in the previous sections for such scenarios with
uncertainties. To this end, we consider that R has a private type ω ∈ Ω governing
his/her cost function and Ω is a finite set of types. For a known type of R, e.g.,
ω ∈ Ω, as shown in both communication and control settings, the problem faced by
the informed agent S can be written in an equivalent form as
min
η1:κ ∈Υ
κ∑
k=1
Tr{HkVω,k} + vo, (84)
for certain symmetric matrices Vω,k ∈ Sm, which depend on R’s objective and corre-
spondingly his/her type. If the distribution governing the type of R, e.g., {pω}ω∈Ω,
where pω denotes the probability of type ω ∈ Ω, were known, then the equivalence
result would still hold straight-forwardly when we consider
Vk :=
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVω,k (85)
since (84) is linear in Vω,k ∈ Sm. For the scenarios where the distribution governing
the type of R is not known, we can defend against the worst possible distribution
over the types in a robust way. In the following, we define the corresponding robust
deception-as-defense game.
Definition 6 The robust deception-as-defense game
Gr := (Υ, Γ,Ω, {xk}, {yk},UrS,UωR ) (86)
is a Stackelberg game [2] between S and R, where
• Ω denotes the type set of R,
• {xk} denotes the information of interest,
• {yk} denotes S’s (possibly noisy) measurements of the information of interest,
• UrS and UωR are the objective functions of S and R, derived based on (3) and (4),
or (8) and (9).
In this hierarchical setting, S is the leader, who announces (and commits to) his
strategies beforehand, while R stands for followers of different types, reacting to the
leader’s announced strategy. Players type-ω R and S select the strategies γω1:κ ∈ Γ
and η1:κ ∈ Υ to minimize the cost functions UωR (η1:κ, γω1:κ) and
UrS (η1:κ, {γω1:κ}ω∈Ω) = max
p∈∆|Ω|
∑
ω∈Ω
pωUS(η1:κ, γω1:κ). (87)
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Type-ω R selects his/her strategy knowing S’s strategy η1:κ ∈ Υ. Let Bω(η1:κ) ⊂ Γ
be type-ω R’s best reaction set to S’s strategy η1:κ ∈ Υ. Then, the strategy and best
reactions pair (η∗1:κ, {Bω(η∗1:κ)}ω∈Ω) attains the Stackelberg equilibrium provided
that
η∗1:κ ∈ argmin
η1:κ ∈Υ
max
γω1:κ ∈Bω (η1:κ ),
ω∈Ω
UrS (η1:κ, {γω1:κ}ω∈Ω), (88)
Bω(η1:κ) = argmin
γ1:κ ∈Γ
UωR (η1:κ, γω1:κ). (89)
Suppose S has access to the perfect measurement of the state. Then, in the robust
deception-as-defense game Gr , the equivalence result in Theorem 2 yields that the
problem faced by S can be written as
min
S∈Ψ
max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVω
}
+ vo, (90)
where we have introduced the block diagonal matrices S := diag{Sκ, . . . , S1} and
Vω := diag{Vω,κ, . . . ,Vω,1}, and Ψ ⊂ Smκ denotes the constraint set at this new
high-dimensional space corresponding to the necessary and sufficient condition on
the covariance of the posterior estimate. The following theorem from [24] provides
an algorithm to compute the optimal signaling rules within the general class of
measurable policies for the communication setting, and the optimal “linear plus
noise" signaling rules for the control setting.
Theorem 4 The value of the Stackelberg equilibrium (88), i.e., (90), is given by
ϑ = minω∈Ω ϑω , where
ϑω := min
S∈Ψ
Tr{SVω} + vo, subject to Tr{(Vω − Vωo )S} ≥ 0 ∀ωo , ω. (91)
Furthermore, let ω∗ ∈ argmin ω∈Ω ϑω and
S∗ ∈ argmin
S∈Ψ
Tr{SVω∗ } + vo, subject to Tr{(Vω∗ − Vωo )S} ≥ 0 ∀ωo , ω∗. (92)
Then, given S∗ ∈ Ψ, we can compute the optimal signaling rule according to the
equivalence result in Theorem 2.
Proof There exists a solution for the equivalent problem (90) since the constraint
sets are decoupled and compact while the objective function is continuous in the
optimization arguments. Let (S∗, p∗) be a solution of (90). Then, p∗ ∈ ∆ |Ω | is given
by
p∗ ∈
{
p ∈ ∆ |Ω | |pω = 0 if Tr{VωS∗} < max
ωo,ω
Tr{VωoS∗}
}
(93)
since the objective in (90) is linear in p ∈ ∆ |Ω | . Since p∗ ∈ ∆ |Ω | , i.e., a point over the
simplex ∆ |Ω | , there exists at least one type with positive weight, e.g., p∗ω > 0. Then,
(93) yields
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Tr{VωS∗} ≥ Tr{VωoS∗}, ∀ωo ∈ Ω (94)
and furthermore
Tr{VωS∗} =
∑
ωo ∈Ω
pωoTr{VωoS∗}, (95)
since for all ωo ∈ Ω such that pωo > 0, we have Tr{VωoS∗} = Tr{VωS∗}. Therefore,
given the knowledge that in the solution p∗ω > 0, we can write (90) as
min
S∈Ψ
max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S
∑
ωo ∈Ω
pωoVωo
}
+ vo = min
S∈Ψ
Tr{VωS} (96)
s.t. Tr{(Vω − Vωo )S} ≥ 0 ∀ωo ∈ Ω.
To mitigate the necessity p∗ω > 0 in the solution of the left-hand-side, we can search
over the finite set Ω since in the solution at least one type must have positive weight,
which completes the proof. 
•! Irrelevant Information in Signals
The optimization objective in (90) is given by
max
p∈∆|Ω|
Tr
{
S
∑
ω∈Ω
pωVω
}
+ vo, (97)
which is convex in S ∈ Ψ since the maximum of any family of linear functions is
a convex function [6]. Therefore, the solution S∗ ∈ Ψ may be a non-extreme point
of the constraint set Ψ, which implies that in the optimal signaling rule S introduces
independent noise. Note that Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [4, 5] im-
plies that there must also be some other (nonlinear) signaling rule within the general
class of measurable policies that can attain the equilibrium without introducing any
independent noise.
9 Partial or Noisy Measurements
Up to now, we have considered the scenario where S has perfect access to the
underlying information of interest, but had mentioned at the beginning that results
are extendable also to partial or noisy measurements, e.g.,
yk = Cxk + vk, (98)
where C ∈ Rm×m and vk ∼ N(0, Σv) is Gaussian measurement noise independent
of all the other parameters. In this section, we discuss these extensions, which hold
under certain restrictions on S’s strategy space. More precisely, for “linear plus
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noise" signaling rules η`
k
∈ Υ`
k
, k = 1, . . . , κ, the equivalence results in Theorems 1
and 2 hold in terms of the covariance of the posterior estimate of all the previous
measurements3, denoted by Yk := cov{E{y1:k |s1:k}}, rather than the covariance of
the posterior estimate of the underlying state Hk = cov{E{xk |s1:k}}. Particularly,
the following lemma from [22] shows that there exists a linear relation between the
covariance matrices Hk ∈ Sm andYk ∈ Smk since xk → y1:k → s1:k forms aMarkov
chain in that order.
Lemma 3 Consider zero-mean jointly Gaussian random vectors x, y, s that form a
Markov chain, e.g., x → y → s in this order. Then, the conditional expectations of
x and y given s satisfy the following linear relation:
E{x |s} = E{xy ′}E{yy ′}†E{y |s}. (99)
Note that s1:k is jointly Gaussian with xk and y1:k since η`i ∈ Υ`i , for i = 1, . . . , k.
Based on Lemma 3, the covariance matrices Hk ∈ Sm and Yk ∈ Smk satisfy
Hk = DkYkD
′
k, (100)
where D
k
:= E{x
k
y ′1:k}E{y1:ky ′1:k}† ∈ Rm×mk . Furthermore, y1:k ∈ Rmk follows
the first-order auto-regressive recursion:
y1:k =
[
E{yky ′1:k−1}E{y1:k−1y1:k−1}†
Im(k−1)
]
︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
=:Ay
k
y1:k−1 +
[
yk − E{yk |y1:k−1}
0m(k−1)
]
. (101)
Therefore, the optimization problem faced by S can be viewed as belonging to the
non-cooperative communication setting with perfect measurements for the Gauss-
Markov process {y1:k} following the recursion (101), and it can be written as
min
η`1:κ ∈Υ`
κ∑
k=1
Tr{YkWk} + vo, (102)
whereW
k
:= D′
k
V
k
D
k
.
•> Dimension of Signal Space
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the signal sk sent by S is mk
dimensional so that S can disclose y1:k . To distinguish the introduced auxiliary
signaling rule from the actual signaling rule η`
k
, we denote it by η˜`
k
∈ Υ˜`
k
and the
policy space Υ˜`
k
is defined accordingly.When the information of interest is Gaussian,
for a given optimal η˜`1:i , we can always set the ith optimal signaling rule η
`
i (·) in the
original signal space Υ`i as
3 With some abuse of notation, we denote the vector
[
y′κ · · · y′1
]′ by y1:k ∈ Rmk .
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η`i (y1:i) = E{x i |η˜`1(y1), . . . , η˜`i (y1:i)}, (103)
almost everywhere overRm, and the right-hand-side is the conditional expectation of
x i with respect to the random variables η˜`1(y1), . . . , η˜`i (y1:i). Then, for k = 1, . . . , κ,
we would obtain
E{xk |η`1(y1), . . . , η`k(y1:k)} = E{xk |η˜`1(y1), . . . , η˜`k(y1:k)}, (104)
almost everywhere over Rm, since for η`1:κ ∈ Υ` selected according to (103), all the
previously sent signals {η`1(y1), . . . , η`k−1(y1:k−1)} are σ-{η˜`1(y1), . . . , η˜`k−1(y1:k−1)}
measurable.
Based on this observation, for partial or noisy measurements, we have the equiv-
alent problem
min
Y1:κ ∈producttext1κk=1 Smk
κ∑
k=1
Tr{YkWk}, subject to cov{y1:k}  Yk  AykYk−1(Ayk)′, (105)
where Y0 = 0. Given the solution Y ∗1:κ , we can compute the corresponding signaling
rules η˜`1:κ according to Theorem 2 and then the actual optimal signaling rule η
`
1:κ ∈ Υ`
can be computed by (103).
10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the deception-as-defense framework for cyber-
physical systems. A rational adversary takes certain actions to carry out a malicious
task based on the available information. By crafting the information available to
the adversary, our goal was to control him/her to take actions inadvertently in line
with the system’s interest. Especially, when the malicious and benign objectives are
not completely opposite of each other, as in a zero-sum game framework, we have
sought to restrain the adversary to take actions, or attack the system, carrying out
only the aligned part of the objectives as much as possible without meeting the goals
of the misaligned part. To this end, we have adopted the solution concept of game
theoretical hierarchical equilibrium for robust formulation against the possibility that
advanced adversaries can learn the defense policy in the course of time once it has
been widely deployed.
We have shown that the problem faced by the defender can be written as a linear
function of the covariance of the posterior estimate of the underlying state. For
arbitrary distributions over the underlying state, we have formulated a necessary
condition on the covariance of the posterior estimate. Then, for Gaussian state, we
have shown the sufficiency of that condition since for any given symmetric matrix
satisfying the necessary condition, there exists a “linear plus noise" signaling rule
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yielding that covariance of the posterior estimate. Based on that, we have formulated
an SDP problem over the space of symmetric matrices equivalent to the problem
faced by the defender over the space of signaling rules. We have first focused on the
communication setting. This equivalence result has implied the optimality of linear
signaling rules within the general class of stochastic kernels. We have provided the
optimal signaling rule for single stage settings analytically and provided an algorithm
to compute the optimal signaling rules for dynamic settings numerically. Then, we
have extended the results to control settings, where the adversary has a long-term
control objective, by transforming the problem into a communication setting by
restricting the space of signaling rules to linear policies plus a random term. We
have also addressed the scenarios where the objective of the adversary is not known
and the defender can have partial or noisy measurements of the state.
Some future directions of research include formulation of the deception-as-
defense framework for
• robust control of systems,
• communication or control systems with quadratic objectives over infinite horizon,
• networked control systems, where there are multiple informed and uninformed
agents,
• scenarios where the uninformed adversary can have side-information,
• applications in sensor selection.
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